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Abstract
The paper presents an economic analysis of the Standard Reinsurance Agree-
ment (SRA), the contract that governs the relationship between the Federal
Crop Insurance Corporation and the private insurance companies that deliver
crop insurance products to farmers. The paper outlines provisions of the SRA
and describes the modeling methodology behind the SRA simulator, a com-
puter program developed to assist crop insurers and policymakers in assessing
the economic impact of the Agreement. The simulator is then used to analyze
how the SRA a®ects returns from underwriting crop insuranceat various levels
of aggregation.
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Risk sharing between private insurance companies and the government has been
an integral part of the federal crop insurance program since 1981. The Federal Crop
Insurance Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-365) encouraged the Federal Crop Insurance Corpora-
tion (FCIC) to privatize functions of the crop insurance program \to the maximum
extent possible". A key component of the 1980 legislation was the enlistment of pri-
vate insurance companies to not only sell and service crop insurance policies, but for
the ¯rst time to share the risks on the policies that they write. By 2001, crop insur-
ance companies were writing policies with a total premium of almost $3 billion and
retaining risks on almost $2.4 billion through the Standard Reinsurance Agreement
(SRA) with the FCIC.
While there has been much research on the federal crop insurance program, most
of the focus has been on how insurance a®ects producer-level risk and the demand
for crop insurance. Research on the reinsurance agreement has focused largely on
the use of contingency markets such as futures and options as alternatives to tradi-
tional reinsurance (Miranda and Glauber; Mason, Hayes and Lence; Turvey, Nayak
and Sparling). An exception is a recent paper by Ker and McGowan that considers
the ability of crop insurance companies to adversely select against the FCIC. Using a
stylized model of the SRA that considered wheat yield distributions in 57 Texas coun-
ties, they demonstrated that companies could increase expected underwriting gains by
ceding more risk to the FCIC in those year where ex-ante projections of wheat yields
suggested potential crop insurance losses. Yet, while their paper provides insight into
how companies may increase underwriting gains through the SRA, their empirical
¯ndings are limited in scope. Crop insurance companies typically write policies in
more than one state and several operate nationwide. Expected underwriting gains
1depend on the underlying crop yield distributions across commodities and regions
and the structure of the SRA. Changes in the latter can have signi¯cant e®ects on
the distribution of underwriting gains and implications for how companies can best
maximize returns.
In this paper, we examine the Standard Reinsurance Agreement between insurance
companies participating in delivery of crop insurance products and the FCIC. Using
historical data on yields and insurance losses for each crop reporting district, crop,
and insurance product, we simulate a distribution of the book of business resulting
from underwriting crop insurance. Distributions of returns are then calculated at
various levels of aggregation. The e®ect of SRA on the rates of return are analyzed
in aggregate and also at the regional and individual company levels.
Standard Reinsurance Agreement
FCIC provides reinsurance for the participating companies in exchange for a por-
tion of insurance premiums collected by those companies. The reinsurance comes in
two forms: proportional and nonproportional. Under the former, the companies cede
their liability for ultimate net losses in exchange for an equal percentage of the associ-
ated net premiums, i.e. completely transfer a portion of their book of business to the
FCIC. The nonproportional reinsurance is then applied to the remaining or retained
portion of companies' books of business. Nonproportional reinsurance is similar to
traditional reinsurance in that the FCIC shares losses with the companies in exchange
for a portion of their underwriting gain1.
Under the proportional reinsurance, each company may allocate its contracts to
one of the three reinsurance funds: Assigned Risk Fund, Developmental Fund, and
1Underwriting gain is the amount by which premiums collected by a company exceed its losses
or the total indemnities it had to pay.
2Commercial Fund. The funds di®er in the required level of retention and also in the
FCIC shares of gains and losses from retained business under the nonproportional
insurance.
The Assigned Risk Fund is characterized by the lowest required retention rate
(20%) which makes it the primary designation for the high-risk contracts. However,
the SRA establishes maximum Assigned Risk Fund cession limits, which vary by
state and range between 10% and 75% of the total book of business in the state
(USDA/RMA 1997, p.10).
The Developmental and Commercial Funds have higher minimum retention re-
quirements (35% and 50%, respectively). In addition, they are further subdivided
into CAT2 Fund, Revenue Insurance Fund, and \All Other Plans" Fund3, which dif-
fer by the type of products that can be placed in each fund as well as the reinsurance
provisions applied to the retained portions of the book of business.
Under the nonproportional reinsurance, the responsibilities of the companies for
the retained losses as well as their shares of the underwriting gains depend on state-
level loss ratios of each company4. For the SRA currently in e®ect5, the shares of
underwriting gains and losses assumed by companies under di®erent realizations of
their loss ratios are shown in Table 1. As the loss ratio increases, FCIC assumes a
larger fraction of company's losses, up to 100% of the portion of losses in excess of
2Catastrophic Risk Protection
3The majority of contracts placed in this fund are Actual Production History (APH) products.
4A loss ratio is de¯ned as a ratio of the total indemnities paid by the company to the total
retained premiums. The loss ratio above 100% means that the company su®ered a net underwriting
loss, while the loss ratio below 100% indicates that the company earned a net underwriting gain.
5The version of the Agreement currently in e®ect was approved by the RMA and private insurance
companies in July 1997 and was subsequently amended by the Agricultural Research, Extension,
and Education Reform Act of 1998. The SRA has been renewed annually by RMA through the 2004
reinsurance year. The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 mandated that the SRA has to be
renegotiated by the 2005 reinsurance year, which begins on July 1, 2004. At the time of writing, the
negotiations were underway, but no ¯nal agreement has been released.
3500% of the total retained premiums. At the same time, FCIC claims a larger fraction
of companies' underwriting gains as their loss ratios decrease.
Figure 1 illustrates the aggregate e®ect of SRA on companies' loss ratios for di®er-
ent reinsurance funds. The Assigned Risk Fund provides the highest level of protection
against losses but also leaves the reinsureds with the smallest fraction of the gains.
The Commercial Fund, on the other hand, gives the reinsureds the highest return in
case of the underwriting gain, but also leaves the largest portion of the net losses on
their balances.
For modeling purposes, the risk sharing provisions of the SRA can be completely
described by the required retention rates for each fund, the breakpoints of the loss ratio




The objective of the SRA model is to simulate distributions of rates of return from
underwriting crop insurance. The rates are driven by net underwriting gains/losses
de¯ned for modeling purposes as the di®erence between the premiums collected and
indemnities paid. Since the latter depends on occurrence or nonoccurrence of ran-
dom events, rates of return are random variables. Reinsurance provided by FCIC is
designed to reduce the downside variability of these random variables and possibly
increase their expected values.
Under the SRA, rates of return are determined by particular realizations of com-
panies' loss ratios at the state level and the SRA parameters, i.e. retention rates,
breakpoints, and shares. Therefore, in order to analyze the e®ect of SRA on the rates
4of return, one needs to model the distribution of loss ratios by state and fund for each
company reinsured by the FCIC.
The random variables that drive the loss ratios are farm-level yields and prices,
which determine the insurance loss for any given contract and thus ultimately the
aggregate losses for any company. However, information on farm-level yields and
prices alone is not enough, as it does not re°ect the adverse selection present in
the crop insurance portfolio and the additional losses companies incur due to moral
hazard. Therefore, the farm-level data on yields and prices should be combined with
appropriate participation data to fully re°ect the distribution of gains and losses in
insurance portfolios.
Ideally, one would like to have a long series of historical data on premiums and
indemnities and use those to derive distributions of loss ratios at the appropriate level
of aggregation. However, practical implementation of this approach would face sev-
eral obstacles. First, the number of contract types available under the crop insurance
program have increased dramatically since 1980, with a large portion of products in-
troduced in or after 1994. Therefore, historical loss data are simply not available for
many contracts prior to 1994. Second, program participation has also increased over
the last two decades both in terms of the acreage insured and coverage levels selected
by the producers. This in turn led to a broader pool of insured risk and decreasing
variation in indemnities. Third, composition and geographical distribution of con-
tracts in participating companies' books of business have changed over time. The
companies have also changed allocation of their books of business across reinsurance
funds. Finally, premium rates6 have also changed over time, thus a®ecting historical
realizations of companies' gains and losses.
6The premium rate of a contract is a ratio of its premium to the associated liability.
5In order to circumvent data limitations and derive distributions of loss ratios that
re°ect the historical changes in the crop insurance programs, the following strategy is
implemented. It is assumed that historical loss costs, or ratios of indemnities to the
total liabilities, accurately re°ect the true distribution of underwriting losses. That
is, it is assumed that the loss costs by crop reporting district7, crop, and insurance
product observed over the historical period (1981{2001) were generated by stationary
data-generating processes that are uniform across companies and reinsurance funds.
Historical loss costs are available for 1981{2001 for selected APH yield contracts
but only in aggregate, thus providing no information about the distribution of loss
costs for speci¯c APH yield contracts, nor other contracts such as CAT and revenue
products. The loss costs for individual products, however, can be simulated by using
historical data on yields and prices and then adjusted to match the observed aggregate
loss costs.
The derived distribution of loss costs for each district, crop, and product can be
combined with the data on liabilities and premium rates for the base year (2001)
and aggregated to compute distributions of loss ratios for each company by state and
reinsurance fund. The distributions of the loss ratios can then be used along with
the SRA parameters to compute expectations and standard deviations of the rates of
return by company, state, and/or reinsurance fund.
Implementation
The ¯rst step in simulating aggregate loss costs of an insurance company by state
and fund is to simulate loss costs for individual insurance contracts (products) in-
cluded in the company's portfolio. While there are more than 20 types of products
7A crop reporting district (CRD) is a statistical unit intermediate between a county and a state.
Each state is typically split into nine or ten CRDs and each CRD typically includes eight to twelve
counties.
6available for more than 100 crops, the lack of adequate data and the limited scope
of some programs do not allow to incorporate all of them into a simulation model.
For the purposes of analysis, six crops and ¯ve major types of insurance products are
considered.
The crops incorporated in the model are barley, corn, cotton, soybeans, grain
sorghum, and winter wheat (0.8%, 42.7%, 13.2%, 27.3%, 2.2%, and 13.7% of total
premiums included in the model, respectively). The insurance products incorporated
in the model are (1) Catastrophic Risk Protection (CAT); (2) Actual Production
History (APH), Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), and Income Protection (IP), each
at f50;55;:::;85g% coverage levels; and (3) Revenue Assurance (RA) contracts at
f65;70;:::;85g% coverage. Together, these combinations of crops and products en-
compass about 65% of the total FCIC liability8 for the base year (2001). More
information about speci¯c contracts can be found in Vedenov (2001).
District level yields for the six crops over the historical period are available from
NASS. A simple log-linear time trend
log(y
tr
t ) = ®0 + ®1(t ¡ 1980); t = 1981:::2001; (1)










2001; t = 1981;:::;2001; (2)
where yt are the observed yields and ytr
t are the corresponding yield trends. The
detrended yields then used to construct the empirical probability density function of
8While it may seem that the model leaves out a signi¯cant portion of the FCIC portfolio, a major
part of it consists of specialty crop contracts concentrated mainly in California and Florida. Outside
of these two states, the proportion of liability covered by the model is about 75%.
7base-year yield distribution by assigning equal weights to each observation. Such an
approach allows to capture correlations between yields in di®erent districts and for
di®erent crops in a simple and e±cient way.
The distribution of yields within the district is modeled using a representative
farmer model. For a given realization of a (detrended) district yield yd, it is assumed
that the individual farm's yield yf is log-normally distributed around the district
average so that
logyf = logyd + log"; " » N(¹;¾); (3)
where the parameters ¹ and ¾ of normal distribution may depend on the district
yield. Under these assumptions, the loss cost for an APH product with the coverage
level ´ can be calculated as E" maxf0;1 ¡ yf=(´y)g.
The historical loss costs are available in aggregate for selected products (APH
35% and f50%;55%;:::;85%g) along with data on liabilities by individual product.
Thus the simulated loss costs can be aggregated using the actual liabilities as weights
and compared to the historically observed loss costs. The parameters of the normal
distribution can be then calibrated so as to minimize the di®erence between the two.
Formally, for a given district, crop, and year, let LCsim(ipj¹;¾) be the simulated
loss cost for the APH product ip, given the parametrization (¹;¾) of the yield shock
", let LC
agg
hist be the historical aggregate loss cost, let B µ f1;:::;npg be the index
subset of APH products included in the aggregate loss cost data, and let Lhist(ip) be
the historical liabilities for products in B. The aggregate simulated loss cost for the


















Once the parameters of the random shocks are calibrated, it is assumed that they
correctly represent the variability of yields for the speci¯c crop, district, and year
and thus can be used to simulate the loss costs for all other products included in
the model. In addition to yields, distributions of harvest-time prices are required to
calculate loss costs for revenue products. The latter are modeled for each crop as
logph = logpb + ®(logynat ¡ logynat) + z; (5)
where ph is the harvest price, pb is the base (projected) price, ynat is the detrended
national yield, ynat is the average detrended national yield, ® is the elasticity param-
eter, and z is a random shock independent of ynat and distributed normally with zero
mean and some variance ¾2.
By combining distributions of yields (3) calibrated according to (4) with the price
distributions in (5), we can derive the distributions of loss costs for all districts, crops,
and products included in the model. Data on base year premium rates and liabili-
ties are then used to aggregate these distributions and arrive at the premium rates
and distributions of loss costs by state, company, and reinsurance fund. Speci¯cally,
9let Lbase(id;ic;ip;io;if) be the base year liability in district id, id = 1;:::;nd, for
crop ic, ic = 1;:::;nc, and insurance product ip, ip = 1;:::;np, that the company io,
io = 1;:::;no, allocated in the reinsurance fund if, if = 1;:::;nf; let PRbase(id;ic;ip)
be the base year premium rate for crop ic and product ip in district id; and let
LCsim(id;ic;ip;iy) be the simulated equiprobable realizations9 of the loss costs expe-
rienced from underwriting insurance product ip in district id for crop ic. Then the
aggregate liability Lagg(is;io;if), the aggregate premium rate PRagg(is;io;if), and
the aggregate distribution of loss costs LCagg(is;io;if;iy) of company io in state is,
































respectively, where the ¯rst summation in all equations is over all districts in the state
is.
In order to account for the proportional part of the SRA, the base year liabil-
ities need to be adjusted by the appropriate retention rates. If a company io re-
tained °(is;io;if) of its book of business in the state is and reinsurance fund if,
then the retained liability is Lret(is;io;if) = °(is;io;if) £ Lagg(is;io;if) and retained
premium is Pret(is;io;if) = PRagg(is;io;if) £ Lret(is;io;if). The nonproportional
part of the SRA then adjusts the distribution of loss ratios LRagg(is;io;if;iy) =
9indexed by iy = 1;:::;ny
10LCagg(is;io;if;iy)=PRagg(is;io;if) according to the schedules in Table 1.
Finally, if LRadj(is;io;if;iy) is the distribution of loss ratios by state, company,
and reinsurance fund adjusted as per SRA, then the corresponding distribution of net
underwriting gains/losses10 can be computed as
NGL(is;io;if;iy) = (1 ¡ LRadj(is;io;if;iy)) £ Pret(is;io;if) (7)
and, if necessary, can be further aggregated by state, company, and/or reinsurance
fund. The subsequent analysis also -uses the rates of return as percent of gross premi-
ums, which can be expressed as r(is;io;if;iy) = (1¡LRadj(is;io;if;iy))£°(is;io;if).















The model is implemented as a Fortran 95 program that employs historical data
and the SRA parameters as input. The program outputs a variety of information
including expectations and standard deviations of both rates of return and net un-
derwriting gains/losses at di®erent levels of aggregation.
Simulations Results and Discussion
In order to analyze the e®ect of the SRA on the variability of the loss ratios and
thus the rates of return, the base year (2001) data on companies' books of business,
10NGL > 0 corresponds to net underwriting gain, while NGL < 0 corresponds to net underwriting
loss.
11allocations, and retention rates have been used to simulate the distributions of the
aggregate loss ratios with and without the SRA. A kernel-smoothing procedure with
variable bandwidth Epanechnikov kernel (HÄ ardle) has been applied to the empirical
distributions computed by the simulator program. Shown in ¯gure 2 are distributions
of loss ratios both by individual reinsurance fund (panels (a){(c)) and in aggregate
(panel (d)).
The pre-SRA allocation of business among the reinsurance funds (dotted lines)
re°ects the di®erence in the level of protection provided by each of them. The Com-
mercial Fund tends to attract less risky contracts, while Developmental and especially
Assigned Risk Funds are used for more risky business. The post-SRA distributions
(dashed lines) are visibly more narrow and shifted to the left. The sample statistics
also indicate that the reinsurance provided by the SRA lowers both the expected
values11 and variability of the loss ratios (Table 2). As expected, the reinsurance
provisions of the Assigned Risk Fund result in the largest decrease in variability of
loss ratios (93%) as well as the largest decrease in their expected values (12.3%).
The reinsurance provisions of the Developmental and Commercial Funds decrease
the variability of loss ratios to a lesser extent, while also resulting in lower decreases
in the expected values.
Since most companies underwrite crop insurance in more than one state, it is
important to consider how SRA a®ects returns on the regional basis. Presented in
Table 3 are pre- and post-SRA expected underwriting gains for the top 20 states in
terms of gross premiums, which together cover 91.5% of the total amount of gross
premiums included in the simulation. The states are listed in the ascending order of
pre-SRA expected gains.
11Recall that loss ratios less than one indicate underwriting gain, and the lower the loss ratio, the
higher the gain.
12Without reinsurance provided by the FCIC, underwriting of crop insurance would
be pro¯table only in eight mostly Midwestern and Plain states (OH, NC, CO, IN, IL,
MN, NE, and IA). The SRA signi¯cantly improves the expected gains in all twenty
states making all but four of them pro¯table. Therefore it comes as no surprise that
even the states with high expected pre-SRA losses attract more than one insurance
company.
The results in Table 2 suggest that the increases in the expected gains due to the
SRA could be achieved through either ceding risky contracts completely or placing
them in the Assigned Risk Fund. Analysis of premium allocation by state (columns
four and six) indicates that this holds true in most cases so that the states with lower
pre-SRA expected gains tend to have lower proportion of business retained as well
as higher proportion placed in the Assigned Risk Fund. One notable exception is
Texas, which has a relatively low pre-SRA expected net underwriting loss yet has
43.3% of business in the Assigned Risk Fund. One possible explanation is that due
to the variation of growing conditions within a state, underwriting crop insurance
may be quite pro¯table in some areas or for some crops, while unpro¯table for others
areas or crops. Aggregated at the state level, the net gains cancel out net losses, but
individual companies may have business concentrated mostly in the low-return areas
and thus tend to use Assigned Risk Fund to higher extent.
Note also that the net e®ect of the SRA on expected gains di®ers signi¯cantly by
state. The general tendency is the lower the pre-SRA gain, the higher the change in
expected gain due to reinsurance, but there are several exceptions to this rule on both
sides. On the one hand, Oklahoma, Georgia, and Wisconsin experience rather modest
increases in the expected gains compared to their pre-SRA levels. In fact, Oklahoma
remains unpro¯table even after the SRA. On the other hand, North Dakota, Kansas,
13and Texas experience relatively high increases in the expected gain even though their
pre-SRA gains are of comparable magnitude. Substantial increases in expected gains
are also observed in Minnesota and Illinois even though underwriting crop insurance
in these two states would be pro¯table even without the reinsurance.
That the pre-SRA expected gains are positive only in a handful of states suggests
that companies have rather limited room for diversi¯cation of their portfolios by
expanding their business into other states. This argument is further supported by
the analysis of regional composition of companies portfolios (Table 4). In 2001, 19
companies participated in underwriting crop insurance. The table presents rates of
return and expected gains these companies would experience without the provisions of
the SRA. Obviously, a direct comparison of these numbers across companies does not
make much sense, since companies underwrite insurance in di®erent states and have
di®erent books of business. Therefore the table includes two measures that re°ect
the regional composition of companies portfolios.
The Her¯ndahl-Hirschner Index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of market
concentration (US DOJ) and re°ects diversi¯cation of companies' portfolios across
states12. The lower the HHI, the more diversi¯ed is the portfolio. Conversely, the
closer HHI to the maximum of 10,000, the fewer states are included in the portfolio.
The second measure is the proportions of each company's gross premiums in two
regions identi¯ed based on the results of Table 3. Region 1 includes the states with
negative expected pre-SRA underwriting gains (MS, LA, AR, MT, SD, OK, ND, GA,
WI, KS, MO, and TX), while Region 2 includes the states with positive expected
pre-SRA underwriting gains (OH, NC, CO, IN, IL, MN, NE, and IA).
The degree of diversi¯cation as measured by the HHI does not seem to be directly
12The actual numbers of states in which companies underwrite crop insurance are withheld to
protect indentity of individual companies.
14related to the expected returns from underwriting crop insurance as companies with
roughly the same HHI may have dramatically di®erent returns (e.g. Company 2 and
Company 12). Variability of returns seems to be slightly more related to the HHI, with
lower HHI corresponding to lower standard deviations of pre-SRA returns, although
not without exceptions (compare Companies 17 and 19). These results are fairly
logical, since the HHI does not take into account returns from individual states nor
correlation between crop yields across states but rather re°ects overall composition
of companies' portfolios.
Allocation of business between the regions, on the other hand, is extremely im-
portant in determining the overall rates of return. Indeed, companies with extremely
high expected losses have major portions of their business concentrated in Region 1,
and vice versa. In other words, it is less important in how many states a company
underwrites crop insurance than where it does so. Finally, in line with the results
in Table 3, the proportion of business placed in Assigned Risk Fund is higher while
the proportion of premiums retained is lower for companies who underwrite mostly
in Region 1 as opposed to Region 2.
The last set of results illustrate the e®ect of SRA on returns of individual compa-
nies reinsured by FCIC in 2001. Presented in Table 5 are the expected rates of return
and their standard deviations calculated with and without the reinsurance. Without
the SRA, eight out of 19 companies would experience net underwriting losses and
all companies would face extremely high variability of expected returns. The SRA
increases the expected returns of all but one company and also signi¯cantly decreases
the variability. Magnitude of e®ect varies by individual companies and once again
composition of companies' portfolios seems to be the most probable explanation.
While watchdog agencies and industry groups may disagree on whether the SRA
15generates excessive returns to participating companies, our analysis suggests a picture
far more complicated than the one re°ected in the bottom line. Net underwriting
gains are not distributed equally across states and companies. Rather, they tend
to be concentrated in a handful of states where the actuarial performance has been
generally good over the time period analyzed. Four states | Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota,
and Nebraska, | account for about two-thirds of total net underwriting gains in the
model. For this reason, companies' net underwriting gains tend to re°ect more where
they write business. Companies who concentrate their business in states with high
returns tend to have higher rates of return than those who underwrite nationwide. At
the same time, the SRA provides a means by which companies can write business in
states with poor expected actuarial performance and yet limit their potential exposure
by placing business in the assigned risk fund. The results also suggest that any change
to the SRA that fails to take into account the regional aspects of the program would
potentially have di®erential, and perhaps destabilizing, impacts on the industry.
Conclusion
This paper presents an economic analysis of the Standard Reinsurance Agreement,
the contract that governs the reinsurance relationship between the Federal Crop In-
surance Corporation and private insurance companies that deliver crop insurance
products to farmers. A simulation model is developed that uses historical data on
yields and prices in order to simulate empirical distributions of insurance companies'
loss ratios under their recent (2001) distribution of business. The crucial assumption
is that the historically observed loss costs, or ratios of indemnities to total liabilities,
were generated by stationary data generating processes and thus correctly represent
the true distribution of underwriting losses.
16The representative farmer model is used to simulate yields for any given district,
crop, and year, with parameters of random yield shocks calibrated so that the simu-
lated loss costs match the historically observed ones. The simulated distributions of
loss costs are then combined with data on liabilities and retained premiums in order
to arrive to distributions of loss ratios aggregated by state, company, and fund for
the base year of 2001.
The simulation program is used to analyze the e®ect of current SRA on the dis-
tributions of loss ratios and rates of return at several levels of aggregation. The
reinsurance provisions of the SRA result in both higher expected values and lower
variability of returns of individual companies thus providing an incentive to partici-
pate in underwriting crop insurance. At the regional level, the SRA makes underwrit-
ing crop insurance pro¯table in most of the major crop producing states, although
the magnitude of the e®ect varies signi¯cantly by individual states.
Further research may include analysis of companies behavior in allocating their
books of business across reinsurance funds so as to maximize their underwriting gains














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18Table 2. Pre- and Post-SRA Distributions of Aggregate Loss Ratios, Sam-
ple Statistics
Pre-SRA Post-SRA % Change
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
All Commercial 0.957 0.471 0.868 0.205 -9.3% -56.4%
All Developmental 1.028 0.376 0.928 0.100 -9.7% -73.5%
All Assigned 1.129 0.305 0.989 0.020 -12.4% -93.6%






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21Table 5. Pre- and Post-SRA Rates of Return by Company
Pre-SRA Post-SRA Change
Exp. Rate Std. Exp. Rate Std. in Exp. Rate in Std.
Company(1) of Return(2) Dev.(2) of Return(2) Dev.(2) of Return(2) Dev.(2)
1 -12.7% 37.9% 3.1% 8.9% 15.8% -29.0%
2 -10.0% 36.4% 6.5% 10.7% 16.5% -25.7%
3 -9.0% 41.4% 5.9% 13.1% 14.9% -28.3%
4 -2.8% 35.1% 5.3% 10.3% 8.1% -24.8%
5 -1.9% 37.2% 9.0% 15.8% 10.9% -21.4%
6 -1.8% 29.6% 6.3% 10.8% 8.1% -18.8%
7 -1.6% 38.1% 6.8% 14.9% 8.4% -23.2%
8 -0.9% 38.0% 9.3% 14.3% 10.2% -23.7%
9 1.2% 62.7% 10.9% 18.3% 9.7% -44.4%
10 1.3% 33.8% 7.4% 10.6% 6.1% -23.2%
11 2.0% 49.1% 8.6% 24.2% 6.6% -24.9%
12 2.8% 38.1% 10.0% 13.8% 7.2% -24.3%
13 3.1% 51.6% 11.2% 17.4% 8.1% -34.2%
14 8.9% 56.9% 14.8% 19.9% 5.9% -37.0%
15 10.3% 55.9% 14.3% 17.5% 4.0% -38.4%
16 11.7% 98.8% 19.7% 35.5% 8.0% -63.3%
17 14.4% 77.2% 18.7% 27.7% 4.3% -49.5%
18 15.1% 93.3% 20.2% 32.9% 5.1% -60.4%
19 20.8% 37.1% 19.2% 25.2% -1.6% -11.9%
All -0.5% 39.5% 9.4% 14.0% 9.9% -25.5%
Notes: (1) The dollar amounts of premiums are withheld and companies' names are replaced by
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